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1) Unit of analysis 
We distinguish between “case” and “episode”.  
A case starts with the first imposition of sanctions against one target and ends when the sender(s) 
remove/s them. A case is thus defined by the identity of the target i.e. sanctions against various 
targets would constitute different cases. A case may be composed by a number of episodes, or by 
one episode alone.  
When a state ceases to exist while it is under sanctions and the sanctioning continues against its 
successor, the episode continues as well (the recorded examples in the dataset are the disintegration 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1963-1992), which became the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (1992-2003), Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006) and Serbia (since 2006) and the 
partition of Sudan (2011). For coherence, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro and Serbia are all abbreviated with FRY in the dataset. 
An episode is characterized by the same sender and goals, i.e. if the sender or the stated goal 
changes this would constitute a new episode.  
An episode is terminated when 
a) Sanctions are lifted;  
b) The goal pursued by the sender changes substantially (democratization: yes/no). 
Episodes are numbered chronologically.  
The unit of analysis is the episode. 
Whenever sanctions by the EU or the US predate the imposition of UN sanctions by more than one 
year, contain substantially different goals or contain substantially different measures (targeted vs. 
selective/sector-based vs. comprehensive measures), these episodes are recorded as separate, 
chronologically parallel episodes.  
The treatment of these measures as separate sanction episodes is due to the frequent lack of 
coincidence between  
a) the goals, nature and scope of the measures as well as  
b) the timing of EU, US and UN sanctions.  
Some unilateral sanctions regimes entail measures that were not adopted under the subsequent UN 
regime, and often the unilateral regimes were left in place for several years after UN sanctions were 
lifted.  
 
2) Dataset 
The dataset is composed of the entire universe of sanctions regimes imposed by the UN, US and EU 
in the period from 1990 to 2010, including those sanctions regimes that were in place by 1990, 
targeting a country, its leadership and entities associated with it. Episodes which are still on-going 
are also recorded. Included are all sanctioned countries which have been coded – at least – at the 
start of sanction episodes as “autocratic regimes” by the Hadenius/Teorell/Wahman dataset on 
authoritarian regimes (2012). 
Given that the investigation explores the impact of sanctions on autocratic regimes, excluded are: 
3 
 
• Sanctions against democratic regimes.  
• Sanctions regimes directed towards rebel groups, terrorists or other individuals and entities 
not associated with a government.  
• Episodes in which state authority had completely collapsed prior to the application of 
sanctions. The dataset includes episodes in which state authority was existent at the time of 
imposition and collapsed later. In order to determine whether a minimum level of effective 
government existed at the time of sanctions imposition, information is obtained from the 
State Fragility Index, Polity IV, produced by the Center for Systemic Peace [we excluded one 
case due to complete absence of statehood: UN_SOM_92 (Somalia)]. 
• Threats of sanctions that failed to materialize; the dataset includes only imposed sanctions.  
• Measures of commercial defense imposed in the framework of trade disputes (cf. in contrast 
the TIES dataset Morgan et al. 2009). The imposition of these measures follows a trade policy 
rationale and their use is – for WTO member states – regulated in the WTO framework. 
Often, they serve as a sole retaliation for other trade measures by the target. Measures only 
dealing with expropriation of assets (Pape 1997). Most of the time, this goal is linked with 
other objectives; these cases are included in the dataset.  
 
3) Data sources 
Data is obtained from the websites of the  
• United Nations, UN Security Council Sanctions Committees,  
• US Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control,  
• US State Department, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls,  
• European Union, European Commission, External Relations.  
These data is complemented by the Hufbauer et al. dataset (2007) – in the following HSE (2007) – 
and the TIES dataset (Morgan et al. 2006). Further bibliographic sources are, amongst others (cf. 
dataset), Charron (2011), Crawford (1997; 2001), Portela (2010), Reynolds and Wan (2012) and 
Taylor (2010) as well as media reporting.  
 
4) Dataset: variables / sanctions characteristics  
 
code  
The first column of the dataset features a code allocated for identification purposes:  
a) Identity of the sender (abbreviated as US, UN or EU) 
b) Identity of the target (abbreviated with the three letter country code ISO alpha 3 (ISO 3166); 
except for the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Serbia and Montenegro and Serbia, which are abbreviated with FRY) 
c) Year of imposition (featuring the last two digits) 
Episodes are ordered according to name of target countries (3rd column) (alphabetical order) and, 
secondly, according to year of imposition of sanctions (4th column). 
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sender 
The dataset takes into account the three main senders of sanctions: the United States (US), the 
European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN). These are coded as a nominal variable.  
 
target 
The dataset indicates the country on which the measures are applied, or in the case of targeted 
sanctions, the country where the targeted individuals or entities are located. They are coded as 
nominal variables with full name. 
 
timeframe 
Year of imposition to year of lifting (or on-going) is considered. In those cases in which sanctions 
lasted for less than one year, their duration is recorded as one year. This variable is ordinal.  
 
goals 
The information on the goals/objectives of sender is presented as nominal.  
The nature of the goals is recorded as formulated by the senders in the imposing documents and 
relevant statements.  
 
demc 
A separate column indicates whether the goal of democratization was pursued.  
CODING: 
Democratization intended = Y 
Democratization not intended = N 
 
We consider that democratization was intended when:  
a) The imposing legislation or statements by the senders mention: 
(1) the demand of holding new elections,  
(2) modifying the constitution or electoral code,  
(3) allowing an international electoral observation mission,  
(4) restoring a democratically-elected leader,  
(5) recognizing electoral results,  
(6) recognizing rights and freedoms directly linked to the electoral process (such as the freedom 
of assembly and expression), and  
(7) the demand for the protection of human rights connected with the establishment the 
conditions allowing for electoral competition.  
While categories 1 to 5 deal with several forms of interrupting the democratic process, 
categories 6 and 7 reflect the imposition of sanctions in response to the breach of human rights 
which are in fact closely linked to the democratic process. 
b) The sender expresses the explicit desire to bring about regime change in the autocratic regime.  
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The information is obtained from the legal documents imposing the sanctions (resolutions, acts, 
common position, conclusions) and accompanying statements by senior officials (permanent 
secretary or equivalent and above).  
 
main goal(s) 
Adapting the model proposed by Charron (2011), goals are classified according to broad categories. 
More than one category may feature for each episode. This categorization excludes value judgments 
and avoids inferring intentions on the senders’ side which deviate from their stated objectives. 
Excerpting senders’ main goals is more difficult than it might appear on first sight as goals are not 
always explicitly stated. Hence, establishing the main goals also includes some subjective assessment 
based on the imposing and further documents.  
CODING: 
• DM = democratization 
• HR = support human rights 
• NR = fight against narcotics  
• MD = stop biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction 
• NW = end nuclear proliferation 
• PC = termination of bellicosities, establishment of peace agreement 
• TR = fight terrorism, including releasing of hostages 
 
measures 
This variable lists the nature of measures / sanctions imposed along a basic classification. The 
variable is nominal.  
CODING 
• AE = arms embargo: encompasses export restrictions of weapons or weapons-related 
technology;  
• AF = freezing of financial assets held by individuals on a personal capacity; 
• AS = aid sanctions: entails the partial or full suspension of aid, including redirection of aid; 
• CE = commodity embargo: encompasses import and export sanctions on selected 
commodities, such as timber, cocoa, oil or diamonds. Due to its frequency, the subtype arms 
embargo is treated in a separate category;  
• CT = comprehensive trade embargo: entails the complete ban of trade and financial relations 
(commercial transactions) with the targeted country;  
• DS = diplomatic sanctions: encompasses limitation of contacts, recall of ambassadors or 
reduction of diplomatic personnel, expulsion from or suspension of membership in 
international organizations or vetoing accession;  
• ES = Enforcement of sanctions: sanctions are imposed against target to enforce sanctioning 
of other sanctioned units; 
• FB = flight ban: entails the prohibition of operating flights to and from the sender(s) or using 
the airspace of the sender countries;  
• FS = financial sanctions: includes investment bans, bans on financial transactions, decisions 
to vote against the granting of loans by the international financial institutions and bilateral 
donors (EU, US), freezing of assets, ban on export credits;  
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• IM = interruption of military co-operation such as military training and advisory services; 
• OT = Other [only one episode: EU_BLR_98 – the reason was the (mis)treatment of diplomats] 
• VS = visa ban: entails restrictions on entry or prohibition on the issuing of visa. 
 
Because of the multifaceted nature of the financial sanctions, the subtypes “aid sanctions” 
(interruption or redirection of development aid)” and “assets freezes” affecting individuals in their 
personal capacity are coded separately and not as part of financial sanctions.  
Technically, the interruption of military co-operation could be categorized as an aid sanction. 
However, this measure has been singled out in a separate category due to its capacity to affect the 
military establishment narrowly – a characteristic that it shares with arms embargoes.  
 
eco 
Economic character of the measures: This variable indicates whether the measures are designed to 
affect the economy of the target country, or a section thereof. The coding is ordinal. 
CODING 
Economic measures = 1  
Non-economic measures = 0  
The following measures are coded as economic or non-economic, respectively.  
Intensity 
scale 
Type of measure Measure belonging to type Economic 
character 
Non-
economic 
character 
1 targeted sanctions AF = asset freeze 
DS = diplomatic sanctions 
VB = visa ban 
AF 
[for coding for 
fsQCA, all 
three types 
are treated as 
being non-
economic] 
DS, VB 
2 sanctions directed 
toward the 
military  
AE = arms embargo 
IM = interruption of military co-
operation 
AE IM 
3 aid sanctions AS = aid sanctions: the partial or 
full suspension of aid 
AS  
4 commodity 
embargo, flight 
bans, financial 
sanctions  
CE = commodity embargo: import 
and export sanctions on selected 
commodities; the subtype arms 
embargo is treated in a separate 
category 
FB = flight ban  
FS = financial sanctions  
CE, FS FB 
5 comprehensive 
trade embargo  
CT = complete ban of trade and 
financial relations 
CT  
     
Further 
non-
economic 
sanctions 
 ES = enforcement of sanctions. 
Sanctions are imposed against 
countries which bust a sanction 
regime against a third party 
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(country)  
OT = Others. Just one case; 
sanctions against Belarus were 
imposed because of 
mistreatment of diplomats.  
 
multi 
Uni-, pluri- or multilateral character of the measures. This variable indicates whether the sanctions 
were imposed by either the EU or the US only, both jointly, or whether sanctions were mandated by 
the UN and, in consequence, compulsory on all states. Voluntary (sometimes also called “hortatory”) 
sanctions recommended by the UN do not feature.  
Sanctions from the US and EU are coded as plurilateral when they were imposed for the first time 
against the same target within the same year and within this year no new sanction episode against 
this target was started. Sanctions are also coded as plurilateral when the US or the EU sanction the 
same target with identical or similar goals of the preceding and still operational unilateral sanctions 
(those will still be coded as unilateral). The coding is ordinal. 
 
CODING 
Unilateral sanctions (only EU or only US) = 0 
Plurilateral sanctions (EU and US) = 1 
Multilateral sanctions (UN sanctions) = 2 
 
intensity 
This variable indicates the (formal) intensity of sanctions in ascending order. This involves an inverse 
degree of “targetedness” of measures.  
The key question for the differentiation is: How likely is it that non-involved individuals of the ruling 
elite in an autocratic regime („innocents“) are hit by sanctions. The higher the probability, the higher 
is the intensity of measures. There is a general distinction between targeted and selective sanctions: 
Selective sanctions are “less than comprehensive sanctions involving restrictions on particular 
products of financial flows”, while “targeted sanctions aim for very narrow effects” (Hufbauer et al. 
2007, p.138). The coding is ordinal. 
CODING 
(1) targeted sanctions, entailing blacklist-based, affecting only designated individuals and 
entities, i.e. visa bans, freezing of financial assets of individuals (also diplomatic sanctions) 
 
selective/sector-based sanctions: affecting specific sectors of the economy or specific policy 
fields (e.g. aid sanctions), but excludes diplomatic sanctions (= all measures which fall short 
of comprehensive but does not feature as a blacklist). Selective sanctions are sub-
differentiated as follows (also following their degree of intensity): 
(2) sanctions directed toward the military (arms embargo and interruption of military 
cooperation),  
(3) aid sanctions 
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(4) commodity embargo, flight bans, selective financial sanctions (investment bans and bans on 
joint ventures),  
 
(5) comprehensive sanctions / comprehensive trade embargo  
 
Diplomatic sanctions are coded as belonging to the category of targeted sanctions because their 
effects are comparable to those of blacklists – they affect targeted leaders and diplomats in their 
personal capacity and are similarly targeted compared to other measures in this category. 
Financial sanctions can be selective (when they affect a broad section of society or the economy) or 
targeted (when they apply to individuals and entities specified on blacklists). For this dataset, they 
are coded as targeted or selective depending on the specific nature of their target.  
 
gradualism 
This variable indicates whether the measures against a target are intensified progressively (often the 
case for targeted sanctions or whether they are applied at-one-go and not changed thereafter until 
termination. The coding is ordinal. 
CODING 
Gradual imposition = 1  
Non-gradual imposition= 0  
[Provisional, needs to be checked] 
 
source 
Column features the identity of the information source from which data for the entry was obtained.  
 
comments 
Features necessary further information for entry.  
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